
Prioritization Of Construction Contracts In The Oil And Gas Fields (Using The Fuzzy Topsis Method) And Comparing The Alliance Method In Common Fields With Them

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Abstract:

In countries with oil and gas reservoirs, different methods of contracts have been used to exploit these resources. In this research, we investigated the types of construction contracts in the field of oil and gas, including 7 previous important models as well as the designed model, i.e. a total of 8 types of contracts and their ranking, and comparing the alliance method with other contracts using the fuzzy TOPSIS multi-criteria decision making technique.

research method:

The conducted research is of an applied type and in terms of data collection, it is a mixed (qualitative-quantitative) type of research. The experts were interviewed and the indicators were extracted. In this research, Excel software was used, and in order to prioritize contracts and compare the alliance method with other methods of construction contracts, the fuzzy TOPSIS multi-criteria technique was used.

Conclusion:

Based on the analysis, it was determined that the OPC alliance method contract was suitable for joint fields and in the ranking, in terms of important and influential indicators in the success of construction contracts, as well as field protection, **environmental protection, sustainable development**, transfer of knowledge and experience, and other important indicators related to contracts, according to experts, $Cl_i=0.79$ has a favorable rating. In this research, for fields that have been explored and have adequate reserves of oil and gas and common fields, the worst type of contract was determined by the scoring method with $Cl_i=0.209$.

Key words: construction contracts, oil and gas field, multi-criteria decision making, fuzzy TOPSIS technique

This article is taken from the dissertation for receiving a specialized doctorate degree in civil engineering, majoring in civil engineering and construction management, with the title of designing a model for concluding construction contracts (in the field of oil and gas) through multi-criteria decision-making techniques at the Islamic Azad University of Iran, Sanandaj branch.

Introduction :

Many regions of the world have rich oil and gas resources and they have exploited those resources to explore and exploit them in different ways and by using one of the types of contracts according to the oil and gas field and the international conditions and the rules and laws of that country.

For countries with oil and gas reservoirs, in addition to obtaining maximum profit and ensuring the interests of shareholders, four desirable features in oil and gas contracts include: sovereignty and ownership of oil and gas resources, respect for national rights and interests during oil and gas operations, transfer of appropriate technical knowledge and skills, and increasing the government's share of oil and gas revenues. (Kaiser¹,2020).

By examining the types of contracts available in this field, we noticed different strengths and weaknesses. According to the needs of the world and Iran and other countries that have common oil and gas reservoirs, the OPC alliance model was designed for common reservoirs and preserving the environment and collecting gases and gas condensates along with oil and preserving data and imparting knowledge and technology, value engineering, strengthening the economy of the countries that own the reservoirs and preventing the sale of crude oil and creating added value by building petrochemical parks and the conversion of oil and gas into oil derivatives and valuable products causes currency gain, employment and sustainable development for the owner of oil and gas tanks. In this research, contracts were ranked using fuzzy TOPSIS method. Since the use of the opinions of experts in this field and accurate statistical methods can provide acceptable results, we have investigated the issue by using qualitative and quantitative models. (Rahimi, Sayari et al., 2022)

1. Research background

In addition to appropriate political developments between countries, currency conversion, unit performance, fuel costs and inflation, having a favorable financial system are among the important factors of development in the field of oil and gas (Kripa and Jaffa², 2020).

According to the studies conducted in the field of oil contracts in other countries, Jaff believes that production participation contracts with foreign companies along with domestic financial resources in Iraq's oil industry can make Iraq one of the successful countries in the field of oil in the region and the world. (Jaffe³, 2019).

In case of observing the principles of "sovereignty and ownership", "guaranteeing safety withdrawal from the field" regarding the maximum use of the engineering power of the country that owns the reservoir, it should not be negligent in the matter of oil and gas contracts (Qolipour and Nasiri Khansari, 2015).

Identifying foreign financing methods and evaluating their ranking is based on three indicators of risk and cost of capital and total risk and cost of capital for foreign financing methods for priority use in the oil industry, in order of preference for cross-selling, lines of credit, guaranteed loans, and financing (Jalili et al., 2019). . Decision criteria for concluding contracts in the upstream sector of oil and gas industries are divided into two general categories: pre-contract criteria and intra-contract criteria. (Momini Wasalian et al., 2018).

¹ Kayser
² Kripa and Xhafa
³ Jaffe

2. Strengths and weaknesses of all types of oil contracts in the world

| Row | contract type | Strengths | weakness |
|-----|--|--|---|
| 1 | Franchise contracts | Transferring the risk of exploration risk to the appropriate investor for unproven oil areas suitable for hard-to-reach areas such as deep seas | Non-compliance with the government's sovereignty and ownership Lack of transfer of knowledge and technology in the stages of exploration and exploitation The benefits of the host country are limited to ownership interests and taxes A relatively long time |
| 2 | Production participation contracts | The country's ownership of part of the reservoirs and part of the production, the sovereignty of the reservoir owner over all exploration and exploitation operations The possibility of transferring the software technology part of the production, according to the contract | Vulnerability of joint exploration and enforcement operations In case of crisis and damage to the investor, the oil field will not be used Pre-production risk in contracts |
| 3 | Mutual sale contracts (Buy Back) | Dependence of contractor fee payment on capital expenditure, control of operation, cost and production by the host government Manpower training The payment will be based on the income from the sale of the product according to the schedule after the start of production | Poor supervision of the employer on the performance of contractors, low flexibility of the contract, lack of commitment of the contractor in operation |
| 4 | Direct investment or finance contracts | Financing is with limited commitment or without commitment, and the repayment of the facility is from the source of the project's income. The yield rate of oil and gas projects is | Non-commitment of the facilitator to achieve the plan If there is a delay in the operation of the project, it is not cost-effective for the unconventional cost of insurance due to the high |

| | | | |
|---|--|--|--|
| | | lower than the interest rate of facilities Long-term contract | investment risk |
| 5 | Engineering, purchase and construction EPC method contracts, | Very high speed of work, reducing the responsibilities of the employer, reducing the total price of the project | The impossibility of complaints and failure to adhere to the commitment by the contractor (claim) |
| 6 | Contracts in oil-rich areas in the south, job based | The reservoir owner's sovereignty over all exploration and exploitation operations Reducing the opportunism of the contractor and the cost of the project Commitment and technical, financial and executive support of the contractor Reducing the risk for the employer | Insisting and always making raw sales Lack of attention to integrated development in common fields with other countries |
| 7 | IPC Iran oil contracts | High contract flexibility Realization of maintenance production and maximum recovery from the tank Realization of maximum production and based on the IPC contract Partnering with a foreign company in the stages of oil discovery, exploitation, field development and extraction | The dependence of the contractor's fee payment on the amount of production from the field, reducing the supervisory role of the employer Failure to include the penalty in case of damage to the tank and loss of primary field production. Lack of attention to integrated development in common fields with other countries The long-term nature of the contract and the possibility of weakening the internal power and the fusion of internal forces among foreign companies and the departure of Iranian experts to these companies. |
| 8 | OPC alliance model | Sovereignty of reservoir owners over all exploration and exploitation operations Very fast work Reducing employer's responsibilities Reducing the cost of the project | The newness of the contract |

| | | | |
|--|--|--|--|
| | | Realization of maintenance production and maximum recovery from the tank Achieve maximum production Special attention to the environment and sustainable development Preventing crude sales and creating added value by building petrochemical parks and producing knowledge- based products | |
|--|--|--|--|


3. Research Methodology

In this research, important and effective indicators in construction contracts in the field of oil and gas were extracted through interviews with experts in this field and extracted after going through the final processes. The research is based on the goal, it is applied and it is a type of mixed exploratory research (qualitative-quantitative). In this research, Excel software was used and fuzzy TOPSIS technique was used to prioritize contracts and compare the alliance method with other methods of construction contracts.

4. Fuzzy TOPSIS method

For the first time, Chen (2000) used the TOPSIS technique with a fuzzy approach in an article entitled TOPSIS method extension to group decision making in a fuzzy environment. To perform the calculations of the TOPSIS technique in a fuzzy manner, first, a suitable language range should be used for data collection. Chen (2000) proposes a seven-point linguistic scale to score each option based on each criterion. Also, the decision matrix can be used to rank the importance of criteria with a technique such as entropy, so Chen has proposed a similar spectrum for ranking criteria. It has also been explained in the discussion of the TOPSIS questionnaire design, usually in the qualitative evaluation of options in the TOPSIS technique, definitive numbers from the nine-point Likert scale are used. In the qualitative evaluation of options in the fuzzy TOPSIS technique, a seven-degree scale is usually used.

The range of seven degrees proposed in the evaluation of options for the fuzzy TOPSIS technique is as follows:



5. Investigating influential factors in construction contracts in the oil and gas field using TOPSIS technique algorithm:

First step - formation of the decision matrix

In TOPSIS technique, m options are evaluated using n criteria. Therefore, each option is given a score based on each criterion. These scores can be based on quantitative and real values or qualitative and theoretical. In any case, an m*n decision matrix must be formed.

| Row | contract type | Effective indicators in the contract | | | | | |
|-----|---|--------------------------------------|-----------|----------------------|---------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------|
| | | Ownership of the field | Time | return on investment | Protection from the field | environmental | Transfer of knowledge and experience |
| | | advantage | advantage | advantage | Disadvantages | Disadvantages | Disadvantages |
| 1 | Franchise contracts | very little | Much | medium | Much | Much | Much |
| 2 | Participation in production | medium | Much | Much | Low | Low | medium |
| 3 | Buy Back | medium | Much | medium | medium | medium | medium |
| 4 | Direct investment or finance | medium | Much | medium | medium | medium | very little |
| 5 | Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) | very much | very much | very much | very little | Low | very little |
| 6 | Job Based contracts | Much | Much | Much | very little | medium | Low |
| 7 | IPC Iran oil contracts | Much | very much | medium | Low | medium | Low |
| 8 | Alliance (OPC) | very much | very much | very much | very little | very little | very little |

Table 1. Decision matrix

Table 2. Converting factors affecting the success or failure of construction contracts in the field of oil and gas using TOPSIS

| Row | contract type | Effective indicators in the contract | | | | | |
|-----|---|--------------------------------------|------|----------------------|---------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------|
| | | Ownership of the field | Time | return on investment | Protection from the field | environmental | Transfer of knowledge and experience |
| | | C1 | C2 | C3 | C4 | C5 | C6 |
| 1 | Franchise contracts | 1 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| 2 | Participation in production | 4 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 5 |
| 3 | Buy Back | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| 4 | Direct investment or finance | 5 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 9 |
| 5 | Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) | 8 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 7 | 9 |
| 6 | Job Based contracts | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 5 | 7 |
| 7 | IPC Iran oil contracts | 6 | 8 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 7 |
| 8 | Alliance (OPC) | 10 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 10 |

technique algorithm into fuzzy numbers

Second step - normalizing the decision matrix

Like other multi-criteria decision making methods, the decision matrix should be normalized. The vector method is used to normalize the values. The vector method, unlike the simple linear normalization method, is performed as follows:

$$n_{ij} = \frac{x_{ij}}{\sqrt{\sum_1^m x_{ij}^2}}$$

Table 3. Normalize the matrix

| Row | contract type | Effective indicators in the contract | | | | | |
|-----|---|--------------------------------------|---------|----------------------|---------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------|
| | | Ownership of the field | Time | return on investment | Protection from the field | environmental | Transfer of knowledge and experience |
| | | C1=0.25 | C2=0.21 | C3=0.19 | C4=0.12 | C5=0.11 | C6=0.12 |
| 1 | Franchise contracts | 0.056 | 0.284 | 0.266 | 0.150 | 0.177 | 0.147 |
| 2 | Participation in production | 0.225 | 0.332 | 0.372 | 0.349 | 0.412 | 0.244 |
| 3 | Buy Back | 0.281 | 0.284 | 0.266 | 0.249 | 0.295 | 0.244 |
| 4 | Direct investment or finance | 0.281 | 0.332 | 0.266 | 0.249 | 0.295 | 0.440 |
| 5 | Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) | 0.450 | 0.427 | 0.425 | 0.449 | 0.412 | 0.440 |
| 6 | Job Based contracts | 0.394 | 0.332 | 0.372 | 0.399 | 0.295 | 0.342 |
| 7 | IPC Iran oil contracts | 0.338 | 0.379 | 0.319 | 0.349 | 0.295 | 0.342 |
| 8 | Alliance (OPC) | 0.563 | 0.427 | 0.478 | 0.449 | 0.412 | 0.440 |

The third step - forming the normal weighted decision matrix (weighting the normalized matrix)

The next step is to form the weighted normal matrix based on the weight of the criteria. Therefore, the weights of the criteria should be calculated using a technique such as AHP or Shannon's entropy. Weighting is very simple, and the weight of each criterion is multiplied by the corresponding weights of that criterion.

The set of weights (w) is multiplied by the normalized matrix (R).

$$W = (w_1, w_2, \dots, w_j, \dots, w_n) \quad \sum_{j=1}^n w_j = 1 \quad 2)$$

For the weighted importance of field ownership C1=0.25, time C2=0.21, return on investment C3=0.19, field protection C4=0.12, environment C5=0.11 and transfer of knowledge and experience C6=0.12 are considered.

Table 4. Weighting the normalized matrix

| Row | contract type | Effective indicators in the contract | | | | | |
|-----|---|--------------------------------------|---------|----------------------|---------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------|
| | | Ownership of the field | Time | return on investment | Protection from the field | environmental | Transfer of knowledge and experience |
| | | C1=0.25 | C2=0.21 | C3=0.19 | C4=0.12 | C5=0.11 | C6=0.12 |
| 1 | Franchise contracts | 0.014 | 0.060 | 0.050 | 0.018 | 0.019 | 0.018 |
| 2 | Participation in production | 0.056 | 0.070 | 0.071 | 0.042 | 0.045 | 0.029 |
| 3 | Buy Back | 0.070 | 0.060 | 0.050 | 0.030 | 0.032 | 0.029 |
| 4 | Direct investment or finance | 0.070 | 0.070 | 0.050 | 0.030 | 0.032 | 0.053 |
| 5 | Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) | 0.113 | 0.090 | 0.081 | 0.054 | 0.045 | 0.053 |
| 6 | Job Based contracts | 0.098 | 0.070 | 0.071 | 0.048 | 0.032 | 0.041 |
| 7 | IPC Iran oil contracts | 0.084 | 0.080 | 0.061 | 0.042 | 0.032 | 0.041 |
| 8 | Alliance (OPC) | 0.141 | 0.090 | 0.091 | 0.054 | 0.045 | 0.053 |

Fourth step - calculation of positive and negative ideals

Calculation of Positive ideal point, PIS and Negative ideal point, NIS is the next step. In this step, a positive ideal (A+) and a negative ideal are calculated for each index.

For criteria that have a positive load, the positive ideal is the largest value of that criterion.

For criteria that have a positive charge, the negative ideal is the smallest value of that criterion.

For criteria that have a negative load, the positive ideal is the smallest value of that criterion.

For criteria that have a negative load, the negative ideal is the largest value of that criterion.

$$\text{Positive ideal point } A^* = \left\{ \left(\max_i v_{ij} | j \in J \right) \text{ and } \left(\min_i v_{ij} | j \in J' \right) | i = 1, 2, \dots, m \right\} = \{ v_1^*, v_2^*, \dots, v_j^*, \dots, v_n^* \}$$

$$\text{Negative ideal point } A^- = \left\{ \left(\min_i v_{ij} | j \in J \right) \text{ and } \left(\max_i v_{ij} | j \in J' \right) | i = 1, 2, \dots, m \right\} = \{ v_1^-, v_2^-, \dots, v_j^-, \dots, v_n^- \}$$

Determining the best and worst answers

Table 5. The best and worst answers

| Row | | Ownership of the field | Time | return on investment | Protection from the field | environmental | Transfer of knowledge and experience |
|-----|----|------------------------|-------|----------------------|---------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1 | V+ | 0.141 | 0.090 | 0.091 | 0.018 | 0.019 | 0.018 |
| 2 | V- | 0.014 | 0.060 | 0.050 | 0.054 | 0.045 | 0.053 |

Fifth step - distance from positive and negative ideals (obtaining the size of the distances)

In this step, the relative closeness of each option to the ideal solution is calculated. For this, we use the following formula:

$$d_i^+ = \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^n (v_{ij} - v_j^+)^2}$$

$$d_i^- = \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^n (v_{ij} - v_j^-)^2}$$

$$CL_i^* = \frac{d_i^-}{d_i^- + d_i^+}$$

The value of CL_i is between zero and one. The closer this value is to one, the solution is closer to the ideal solution and is a better solution.

Table 6. Distance from positive and negative ideals

| Row | The title of the contract | Distance from positive ideals +di | distance from negative ideals di- | The amount of CLi |
|-----|---|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1 | Franchise contracts | 0.136 | 0.036 | 0.209 |
| 2 | Participation in production | 0.092 | 0.049 | 0.348 |
| 3 | Buy Back | 0.087 | 0.061 | 0.412 |
| 4 | Direct investment or finance | 0.084 | 0.062 | 0.423 |
| 5 | Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) | 0.047 | 0.107 | 0.697 |
| 6 | Job Based contracts | 0.059 | 0.088 | 0.597 |
| 7 | IPC Iran oil contracts | 0.069 | 0.075 | 0.520 |
| 8 | Alliance (OPC) | 0.036 | 0.136 | 0.791 |

The sixth step - ranking the options

At this stage, based on the results obtained from the TOPSIS fuzzy method, the options are ranked, the results of which are described in the table below.

Table 7. Rating of construction contracts in the field of oil and gas

| Row | The title of the contract | rank | CLi value | explanations |
|-----|---|----------|-----------|--------------|
| 1 | Franchise contracts | 8 | 0.209 | |
| 2 | Participation in production | 7 | 0.348 | |
| 3 | Buy Back | 6 | 0.412 | |
| 4 | Direct investment or finance | 5 | 0.423 | |
| 5 | Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) | 2 | 0.697 | |
| 6 | Job Based contracts | 3 | 0.597 | |
| 7 | IPC Iran oil contracts | 4 | 0.520 | |
| 8 | Alliance (OPC) | 1 | 0.791 | |

The OPC unification method has a favorable rating for common fields and border areas with Cli=0.791.




Figure 3. OPC model

Conclusion and comparison of alliance method (OPC model) with other contracts:

After the necessary investigation, using the output of the TOPSIS fuzzy method, it was determined that the alliance model (opc) was favorable for common fields and border areas and in addition to unification of joint oil and gas fields with other countries, the ownership and governance of the field and the protection of oil reservoirs and related data have been observed, transfer of knowledge and technology and reverse engineering and self-sufficiency of the tank owner has been done, the sale of crude oil has been prevented, by converting crude oil into products with high added value and producing knowledge-based products, it creates currency for the tank owner. **By extracting flare gases with oil and using them, it has reduced pollutant emissions and preserved the environment, with the construction of petrochemical industries and petrochemical parks, attention to sustainable development and job creation is well seen.**

Based on the analysis, it was determined that the OPC alliance method contract was suitable for joint fields and in the ranking, in terms of important and influential indicators in the success of construction contracts, as well as protection of the field and preservation of the environment, sustainable development, transfer of knowledge and experience, and other important indicators related to contracts, according to experts, it has a favorable rank with $Cl_i=0.791$. In this research, for fields that have been explored and have adequate reserves of oil and gas and joint fields, the worst type of contract was determined by the scoring method with $Cl_i=0.209$.

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